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The Choice of Exchange Rate System for Developing Countries
1 . Introduction
From the World War 2 period until the early 1970s, the
major industrial nations operated under a fixed exchange rate
system, in which most nation's currencies were linked to the
U.S. dollar with a par value while the dollar was pegged to
gold. In the early 1970s, since the United states had
experienced a high balance of payment deficit and a reduction
in her official gold holdings and the convertibility of the
dollar had been decreased, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system occurred. Since then, a wide variety of exchange rate
systems has been introduced. Article IV of Amendment 2 to the
Fund's Articles of Agreements formally legalized that
different types of exchange rate systems can be chosen by
countries in terms of their needs. Since a variety of exchange
rate arrangements emerged, increasing concern has been given
to choose one of the most appropriate exchange rate regime
among these systems. Countries could choose a pure floating
or a managed floating with various degrees of intervention
based on their own economic circumstances and policy
objectives. Countries also could seek to peg their curriencies
to a particular major currency, an individual basket of
curiencies or to the SDR. Because the currencies of the major
industrial countries have floated, several studies have
focused on the problem how developing countries should adjust
their exchange rate policy. It is these questions that this
paper will address.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I will
briefly describe the theory of the choice of an exchange rate
regime. In section 3, I will review the principal issues of
the choice of exchange rate regime for developing countries.
Characteristics of developing countries and the feasibility
of floating exchange rates in developing countries will be
presented in section 4. In section 5 and 6, I will discuss
flexible exchange rate VS. fixed exchange rate and the choice
of an appropriate peg, respectively. The conclusion is in
section 7.
2 . The Choice of An Exchange Rate Regime Theory
The economic characteristics of a country determines what
type of exchange rate system it should choose. It is
impossible that any one exchange rate system will be suitable
to all of the countries which differ in their economic
characterestics. Research by Heller (1978) validated five
factors particularly important in choosing an exchange rate
system:
A. Size of country
Nations that peg their exchange rate tend to be " small
"/ While nations that prefer flexible exchange rates tend to
be " large ". The reasions for this are: a small country is
too small to be able to affect the world market prices of
traded goods. Whereas a large country is likely to be a price
makers in world market. In addition, a large diversified
economy that produces a variety of traded and nontraded goods
may insulate from exogenous shock so that it can float
smoothly. A small undiversified country may find it necessary
to insulate disturbance of fluctuation in world prices by
pegging.
B. Openness of an economy
Another important factor in choosing an exchange rate
system is the openness of an economy.^ A " closed " economy
tends to choose a flexible exchange rate, while an open
economy finds it preferable to fix the exchange rate. In a
closed economy an exchange rate depreciation ( appreciation )
offsets the decrease (increase) of the foreign currency price
of trade goods and leaves the domestic prices unchanged and
maintain the employment in the traded goods sector constant
without hurting the equilibrium in the nontraded goods sector.
These reduce the cost of adjustment to external disturbances.
C. The development of financial market Integratd with
.Small, in this context, is in economic, not geographic,
sense. The small country is unable to influence the world price of
traded goods. It will be measured by GNP.
.The degree of openness depends on whether nontraded goods
play an important role in the economy.
world market .
The development of domestic financial market integrated
with world markets plays an important role in the choice of
an exchange rate system. Under fixed exchange rates, countries
cannot pursue independent monetary policies because an
expansionary monetary policy will result in a balance of
payments deficit. Thus, international captial flows will
nullify the goals of money policy. Unlike fixed exchange
rates, one of the advantages claimed for flexible exchange
rates is the ability of individual nations to pursue
independent monetary policy. Hence, countries with well
developed financial markets integrated with world markets tend
to choose floating rates. Countries with poorly developed
financial markets integrated with world markets expect to
maintain a par value due to its lack of disturbance of foreign
capital flows.^
D. Inflation rate.
According to the purchasing power parity hypothesis:
P=ep* ; where P=domestic price level, e=domestic currency
price of foreign exchange, and P*=price level in the "rest of
the world." If the exchange rate is fixed, the domestic
inflation cannot diverge from the world inflation rate, or it
will result in official settlements deficits or surpluses.
. In a country with poorly developed financial markets, the
exchange rate will be determined only by current flows, not capital
account flows.
Therefore, countries with a different inflation rate from
those prevailing elsewhere tend to choose a floating exchange
rate than to maintain a fixed exchange rate.
E. The pattern of international trade.
A large, diversified economy tends to choose a floating
exchange rate, and a country with high geographic
concentration in trade is more likely to be a pegger. A
country with close trading ties with one major partner does
better to peg its exchange rate to its partner's currency.
Heller (1978) examined the theory using the discriminant
analysis based on that available data. He found that floatters
are supposed to have the following characteristics:
(1) a large size, (2) a relatively small foreign
trade sector, (3) a high degree of international
financial integration, (4) an inflation rate that
differs from the world average, and (5) a well
diversified foreign trade pattern.
Peggers tend to have the opposite characteristics. His
analysis also found that a crawling peg country typically
resembles peggers instead of floaters.
To the choice of an appropriate peg, the analysis shows
that trade shares are very important; countries whose trade
takes place largely with one major industral nation tend to
peg the currency of that nation. A well-diversified trading
pattern tends to peg to a basket of currencies.
3. Principal Issues of The Choices of Exchange
Rate Regime in Developing Countries
We have already examined the theory of the choice of an
exchange rate regime. Now we want to give an overview of
principal issues of the choice of exchange rate regime in
developing countries.
Assume a developing country can and should let its
currency float independently. ( Here, floating is in general
cconsidered as a pure float.) A number of authors raise the
question as to whether conditions exist in developing
countries that would allow exchange rate to float
independently, if you assume that the exchange rate is
determined by the market. Black (197 6) and Branson and
Katseli(1981) , for example, have argued that certain
characteristics which existed in many developing countries
excluded floating as a feasible or realistic option. Other
authors directly consider whether a fixed or flexible exchange
rate regime is better in terms of economic characteristics of
developing countries (discussed in section 4)
.
It is perhaps significant that flexible exchange rates
are considered as synonymous with floating rates in most of
this literature, and that the studies thus are oriented toward
countries with well developed and integrated financial
markets. In fact, a flexible exchange rate does not
essentially imply that the exchange rate is determined by the
market forces without government intervention. The authorities
may control or directly determine the exchange rate and decide
their exchange rate policies. Here we must distinguish the
difference between a pure flexible exchange rate (freely
floating) and a managed floating exchange rate. A freely
floating exchange rate system is a system in which the
exchange rates are determined by the market without government
intervention. A managed floating exchange rate system is a
system in which exchange rates are allowed to change with
respect to market conditions, but governments may intervene
in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the exchange
rates. (May refer to Froyen, Chapter 17)
The feasibility of a floating exchange rate for
developing countries depends on: a. the existence of adequate
domestic financial markets integrated with world markets; b.
the willingness by the authorities to abolish intervention in
the exchange market. (Black, 1976, P.l) As most developing
countries have less developed financial markets and refuse to
allow the exchange market to operate freely without government
intervention, a floating exchange arrangement is ruled out on
the grounds of feasibility or optimality in the process of the
choice of a regime. Most developing countries have maintained
a fixed peg for their exchange rates management. The problem
to be analysized is to peg to a single currency or a basket
of currencies. These will be disscussed in detail in the
following sections.
4. Characteristics of Developing Countries and The
Feasibility of Floating Exchange Rates in Developing
Countries
Developing countries have generally tended to choose an
adjustable par regime over others. The difference in economic
characteristics and institutional framework to developed
countries have an important bearing on the choice of an
exchange rate regime for developing countries. In this section
we shall indicate what these characteristics are and what
bearing they have on the adjustment process.
A. Characteristics
1. Most developing countries are price-takers. They are
not able to affect world prices of their exports or imports
through their exchange rate policies. The production of most
developing countries are mainly primary products. Few have
highly developed manufactures. Usually a given LDC's primary
products are fairly homogeneous, and the export share of each
developing country in the international market for its
particular export good is in most cases small.
2. The demand for imports is inelastic in developing
countries due to little substitutability between imports and
domestic goods. Also, in the short run, the supply of of
exports is inelastic because the gestation periods of primary
product production is long and the ability to absorb exports
domestically is limited.
3. Most developing countries have less developed
financial and exchange markets. Financial intermediation is
still rudimentary. Financial institutions in developing
countries are sparse. There are only a few banks that provide
short-term credit; the foreign- exchange market functions
mainly through the central bank with domestic financial market
and very few foreign exchange brokers and dealers; there is
no forward market.
4. Capital mobility is low in developing countries. For
developing countries, capital inflows and outflows are often
governed by factors other than interest rate differentials due
to their insufficiently developed financial markets.
Uncertainty concerning political and economic developments has
substantial influences on the capital account, even on the
short-term capital flows. (Black, 1976, and Crockett and
Nsouli, 1977)
We have already indicated the economic characteristics
of developing countries above. Following we will examine
whether the floating exchange regime is feasible to developing
countries. Developing countries should consider their
particular economic circumsatances and their policy objectives
in deciding what exchange rates strategy to follow.
We have known that adequate development of domestic
financial market and a high degree of international financial
integration are the premises for a policy of floating exchange
rates. Black (1976, P. 18 and P. 37) and Branson-Katseli( 1981,
P. 394, hereafter cited as B-K; the two sources together )
argued that there are in fact two conditions for floating:
first, that domestic financial markets of some minimium depth
exist; and second, there must be some minimum degree of
substitutability between domestic and foreign securities in
the portfolios of both domestic and foreign residents. B-K
believed that if a developing country satisfies these
conditions, then in the short-run its exchange rate is
determined by equilibrium conditions in financial markets, and
the short-run stability of the exchange rate depends on the
overall stability of these markets. With an integrated
financial asset market, countries can expect a floating rate
to be stable in the short run. B-K argue that if asset markets
in a developing country are not integrated with international
markets, then supply and demand in the foreign exchange market
are determined by current account flows. Therefore the short
run stability conditions of the foreign exchange market are
the Marshall-Lerner conditions on trade elasticities. The
feasibility problem, as put forward by B-K, is that countries
with any degree of market power would be unlikely on
theoretical grounds to hold these conditions in the near term.
A model developed by Driskill and McCafferty (1980)
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illustrate the central point made by B-K; if financial market
separation prevents the possibility of speculative capital
flows in the short run, then the floating rate will be
unstable. The central bank must intervene and "make the
market" for foreign exchange, thereby ruling out free floating
as a feasible regime. (Also, refer to B-K, 1981, P. 395)
we have argued that the exchange and financial markets
of developing countries differ from the institutional and
market structure of developed countries. The financial
institutions and asset markets in most developing countries
are not able to function competitively and efficiently.
Forward exchange markets are often non-existent, and markets
for common stocks, securities, and bills are often poorly
developed, thin, or absent. The major financial intermediation
is the banking system, which offers a limited range of
financial instruments and whose size and structure is small
in comparision with that of developed financial systems.
(Black, 1976, P. 17-18) Thus, the floating may not be feasible
in the developing countries.
In some developing countries, the financial
intermediaries are concentrated in relatively few hands and
would not provide for effective competition in determining
interest rates or the exchange rate. Under such circumstances,
allowing the exchange rate to float independently is not a
realistic option, and it is appropriate that exchange rate is
determined by government directly.
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Black(1976, p. 26) argued that free floating exchange
rates would require in many developing countries a substantial
further commitment of real resources to the development of
adequate asset markets, as well as a willingness by the
authorities to allow the exchange market to operate
independently
.
Floating would require not only the existence of exchange
markets but also their potential to become broader, more
developed, and better integrated into world market within a
favorable policy environment (Black, 1976, P. 17). In some
developing countries, particularly in Latin America and Asia,
such as Brazil, Isral and Lebanon, current transactions have
been much liberalized following very rigid restriction and
control. Financial reforms have been undertaken that have
stimulated competition between financial intermediaries and
development of financial intermediaries. Meanwhile, domestic
financial markets have been partially opened up to world
markets. These policies would be expected to yield significant
benefits in the form of substantial reduction of resource
misallocation. (Bruno and Sussman, 1979 and Black, 1976; the
two sources together) But in most cases, some degree of market
segmentation is likely to continue. Some parts of the domestic
financial markets may remain controlled or subject to
different reserve of liquidity requirements, and the link
between foreign and domestical financial markets may be
restrained by the regulations and restrictions relating to the
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acquisition of foreign assets and the incurring of foreign
debt. Nevertheless, there is likely to be sufficient freedom
in the exchange market and sufficient number of participants
and institutional development that foreign exchange market no
longer performs primarily through the central bank. Floating
may well constitute, therefore, a feasible exchange rate
regime for some developing countries; several developing
countries with relatively advanced financial systems, such as
Malaysia, Singapore, Nigeria, Israel and Lebanon, have indeed
experienced periods in which the exchange rate has
floated. (Refer to Black, 1976, P. 17, 26 and P. 32-36)
5. Flexible Exchange Rate VS. Fixed Exchange Rate
Even though floating exchange rates are difficult to
implement by developing countries, floating is not the only
form of exchange rate flexibility that can be envisaged. Two
questions therefore arise: first, whether flexibile exchange
rate reduce the impact of external and internal disturbances.
In other worlds, whether it promote adjustment to various
shocks and provides economic stability. Second, how can a
developing country obtain the appropriate degree and timing
of flexibility if it does have these benefits? (Refer to
Williamson, 1982, P. 53, 54; Black, 1976, P. 6-7)
Arguments in favor of a flexible exchange rate for
developing countries has been strongly restated by Flanders
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and Helpnian(1978, hereafter cited as F-H ). They consider the
exchange rate policy for a small, open country that produces
both tradable and nontradable goods and is a price taker for
tradable goods. Thus there exist relative prices of traded to
nontraded goods in the country. Then the exchange rate matters
or at least potentially matters by changing the relative
price. The country faces external shocks caused by shifts or
fluctuations of world price of tradables, and internal
disturbances due to a shift or fluctuation in tastes between
traded and non-traded goods. With the flexible exchange rate
system the governments determine the money supply, and the
exchange rate adjusts perfectly to achieve external balance;
with a fixed exchange rate, authorities implement a well-
organized policy that equates the money supply to money demand
at each point in time to. maintain external balance. If all
wages and prices are flexible, full employment is maintained;
and the choice of an exchange rate regime between two regimes
is indifferent. But flexible exchange rates will result in
greater price stability than fixed exchange rates in response
to external disturbances. (F-H, P. 45)
In the F-H model, for a foreign price shock, a policy
dilemma can arise in a fixed exchange rate. A monetary policy
with the goal of maintaining external balance will result in
unemployment; full employment may be achieved only at the cost
of a balance of payments deficit or of a highly strained
fiscal policy, such as government spending policy and tax
u
policy. (F-H, 1978, p. 55) However, for a foreign price shock,
flexibility in the exchange rate will be able to ensure full
employment, the effect caused by the foreign price shock is
offset by a change in the exchange rate. In addition, with a
flexible exchange rate system, the increase in demand and
decline in supply in the foreign exchange market as a result
of the expansionary monetary policy will cause the exchange
rate to rise so as to attain full employment and a balance of
payments. The converse is also. A flexible exchange rate is
always more desirable than a fixed exchange rate in the
presence of downward rigid price and wage. (Also, refer to
Froyen, 1983, Chapter 17)
F-H concentrate on pursuing a full employment objective
in the face of particular types of shocks. (F-H, P. 45) Black
has emphasized the exchange rate policies for stabilization
in response to external and internal shocks. The variance of
the domestic relative prices is taken for granted for main
measures of stability. (Black, 1976, P. 12) The optimal exchange
rate policy from a stabilization point of view depends on the
type and nature of the shocks that the developing country
faces. Black argues that the optimal policy is to peg the
exchange rate through reserve use, foreign official borrowing,
or both, thus providing some insulation to the domestic
economy. The flexible exchange rate policy will serve best to
reduce the incidence of domestic relative price fluctuations
and resource shifts. (Refer to Black 1976, P. 4 and P. 5; also
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Williamson, 1982, P. 40-41)
In contrast to F-H, Lipschitz (1978) considers the
exchange rate policy for an economy that is small and only
produces tradable goods. He has focused attention on
minimizing fluctutations in domestic absorption in response
to demand and supply shocks of domestic origin. The results
given by Lipschitz are that countries subject to shocks
originating solely in demand shock should operate a pure
flexible exchange rate( free floating exchange rate) and those
subject to shocks originating in supply fluctuations should
fix their exchange rate. Where a country is subject to both
sorts of domestic shocks, a managed floating exchange
rate (flexible exchange rate) is the superior strategy. In his
model, he did not ascribe any importance to various sorts of
shocks, relative prices level, and the exchange rates. This
limitation, he suggests, might weaken the case raised for
exchange rate flexibility in response to domestic monetary
disturbances. (Refer to Lipschitz, 1978, P. 668 and P. 669) In
Black's model(1976), in contrast, he considered the
undesirability of the relative price changes, generated by
monetary or price disturbances at home and abroad, with
respect to internal and external balance, and argued in favor
of a flexible exchange rate. (Black, 1976, P. 9 and P.. 11)
We reached a general conclusion from these simple
theoretical analysis above: the optimal exchange-rate regime
in the face of various types of disturbances may be one
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intermediate between a completely fixed and a completely
flexible exchange rate (This is represented by Frankel and
Aizenman (1981)). The further policy problem is to determine
the appropriate level and type of exchange rate management.
Of course, what appropriate level and type of exchange rate
management a country should chose should depend on its
financial and administrative abilities. But these abilities
are determined by the financial institution features and the
development of the foreign exchange market. Therefore, it is
important to consider the institutional features and the
development of the foreign exchange market in determining the
appropriate level and the type of exchange rate management.
Foreign exchange markets are insufficiently developed,
the foreign exchange market functions mainly through central
bank with very few foreign exchange dealers in most developing
countries. The monetary authorities directly determine the
value of the domestic currency in relation to the intervention
currency by adopting a price-setting rule or convention. With
an adjustable peg, the price-setting rule applied is
relatively straightforward. An alternative is to include in
the price-setting rule more continuous reference to some set
of variables or indicators, for example, an exchange rate
regime using a form of crawling peg or gliding parity.
A crawling peg is where the countries determine and
periodically change their exchange rate according to
predetermined set of rules. (Blejer and Leiderman, P. 133)
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The exchange rate policy should also aim at neuatrlising
the inflation differentials or obtaining "target" of the
authorities. If this target is in excess of inflation rates
prevailing elsewhere, the price of domestic currency should
be depreciates to offset the inflation differential. The
converse is also. It may lead to highly disruptive speculative
fluctuations in the supply of and demand for foreign currency
under an adjustable-peg regime. Large and infrequent exchange
rate devaluations do not prevent the exchange rate from moving
out of alignment in the interim and it may add to the
uncertainty surrounding prospective economic developments.^
However, unlike under an adjustable-peg regime, under a
crawling-peg system the exchange rate is changed frequently
and in small steps according to some predetermined set of
rules in order to achieve the government's objectives. (Blejer,
1981, P. 137) It can avoid many of the disadvantages inherent
in large and abrupt devaluations. For example, in 1975 Israel
implemented a crawling peg system with discrete adjustment of
3 to 4 percent and also decided to allow for a minimum period
3 days between each adjustment in order to reduce the
profitability of anticipatory speculations. (Bruno and Sussman,
1979)
A crawling peg can be used not only in those countries
whose inflation rates are exceptionally high by international
'*. Refer to Williamson(1982)
, P. 41, 47, and Enders and Harvey,
chapter 16.
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standards, but also in these developing countries following
conservative monetary policies because they could affect a
gradual appreciation of the domestic currency through a
crawling peg that is based on an assessment of underlying
price and cost trends. In any event, the authorities would be
following purchasing power parity closely in the management
of exchange rate policy, thereby avoiding trend movement away
from an initial value of some real exchange rate indicator.
Also, the uncertainty with regard to the exact timing of
devaluation is increased, and the profitability of short-run
speculation has greatly reduced. Thus, it will prevant
destabilizing speculation. '(Refer to Bruno and Sussman, 1979,
P. 510 and Blejer, 1981, P. 143)
Williamson (1982, P. 57) has strongly recommended an
overall exchange rate policy dedicated to preserving the
constancy of the real exchange rate. He considers that the
most efficient way to preserve a constant real exchange rate
is to use a crawling peg based on a relative inflation rate
indicator. The policy rule for exchange rate managemenmt
developed by Black (1976) ^Iso designed to stabilize the real
effective exchange rate, or REER, index.*
This policy rule which sometimes is referred to as
. Destabilizing speculation is when an increase in the spot
exchange rate reguired an even larger increase in the forward rate
to equilibrate the forward market.
.
A more explicit theoretical treatment of effective rate
indices, see Rhomberg [1975].
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"pegging" the REER index has raised some controversy in the
literature on exchange arrangements and "optimal" basket.
Lipschitz and Sundararajan have claimed that the stabilization
of some REER index can be considered an appropriate policy
objective—in the case to minimize the variance of the real
exchange rate about its equilibrium level over some reference
period. (L-S, P. 80 and P. 82) Whereas a policy of the Black-
Branson-Katseli type, which in the limit implies continuous
discretionary management of a real exchange rate index, is
impractical since the price data are usually available only
with a substantial lag. Williamson (1982) argues that the
implementation of a reasionable approximation to the policy
rule would be possible because inflation rates have a high
degree of serial corelation and make it possible to predict
current inflation rates. Further, adopting the policy rule
practically based on the kind of price indices, such as
relative consumer price or wholesale price indices, is
questionable because these price indice suffer from several
limitations, such as a measure of uncertainty, coverage
limitations and the presence of price controls and subsidies,
that make estimate of an unambiguous price difficult and many
developing countries implement the policy rule not using these
simple price indices but available price and cost data.
In addition to these important practical and technical
issues, there is general agreement on a theoretical level that
an exchange rate management policy oriented toward the
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stabilization of some real exchange rate index will be
insufficient to maintain external balance. Changes in economic
conditions or circumstances that a developing country faces,
such as an unpredictable trade shock, may require a change in
exchange rate and other policies to affect an alternation in
the real exchange rate for external balance adjustment.
Reflecting some of the considerations outlined above,
many developing countries have moved to adopt a more active
exchange- rate management. Meanwhile, an increasing number of
countries' exchange arrangements are based on a link between
the domestic currency and a basket of foreign currencies.
6. The Choice of An Appropriate Peg
Having made the case for a flexible exchange arrangement
in a developing country, the question remains: To what should
a country peg ? Pegging to another currency, or a basket of
currencies. The substantive issue is what objectives are to
be realized through the choice of a peg and, correspondingly,
what problems and circumstances should be considered as
relevant for the specificication of these objectives.
Choosing a peg is regarded as a policy instrument to
avoid or at least minimizfe exchange rate fluctuations among
foreign currencies . It concerns stabilizing particular target
variables to the extent possible from the effects of exchange-
rate fluctuations among foreign currencies. A common criterion
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is to minimize the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on
the economy required a policy of seeking to stabilizing the
effective exchange rate index. In principle, the solution to
choosing a peg with the objective of stabilizing the effective
exchange rate appears straightforward: the country should opt
for a weighted basket of currencies. (Refer to F-H, P. 391-392)
We have mentioned that the choice of peg is seen as an
instrument to realize the given policy objectives. But what
are the objectives to be realized and what is the choice of
an appropriate peg ? It is these questions that we will
discuss in this section. In order to decide the choice of the
appropriate peg to realize the policy objectives sucessfully,
we should first examine the advantages and disadvantages of
the two possible alternative pegs, and then we will review the
objectives that have been considered to guide the choice of
peg.
(a) Pegging to a single currency
Most developing countries have been in favor of begging
to a single major currency, because it is equivalent to
maintaining the exchange market policy under adjustable par
values. However, the consequences for the country will be
different from those under adjustable par values under which
the value of the currency will change against the currency to
which it pegged.
22
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We will summarize various advantages attributed to
pegging to a single currency. First, pegging to the currency
of a large trading partner whose foreign exchange rate has a
low variance of the effective exchange rate will tend to
minimize the exchange rate fluctuations between the developing
country and its partner and facilitate trade between the two
countries. Also, investment capital flows from abroad may
increase. Second, the resource misallocation due to the
maintenance of inappropriate exchange rates will probably be
much less. Third, if the exchange rate of the industrial
country is more stable than the exchange rate of the
developing country without pegging, then trade with and
investment from the rest of the world will be stimulated.
Fourth, stability can be achieved at a minimum administrative
cost and difficult with public acceptance. Fifth, a developing
country choosing to peg its currency to the partner whose
policies are considered to be adequate to the promotion of
relatively stable prices will increase confidence in its own
currency. Then, the country can benefit from greater trade and
more capital flow. Lastly, the high variance contributed by
very large devaluations will be mitigated since required
devaluations will probably occur more frequently. However, at
least four potential disadvantages are seen in a single
currency peg. First, the cost of reserve holding may increase
due to greater fluctuation of the balance of payments induced
by inappropriate foreign exchange rate changes. Second, with
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a single currency peg, internal policy may be interfered with
by the exchange rate fluctuation, which is independent of
government policy. A third drawback to a single currency
pegging is the variability of intra-LDC exchange rates
resulting from different pegs. A fourth disadvantage is that
it may increase import prices. To compensate for the increased
uncertainties involved in trade with the developing country,
suppliers may be required to increase their product prices.
The supplier in the industrial country to whose currency the
developing country is pegged has a stronger market position
and increases its ability to claim higher profit margins. (B-
K, 1981, C-N, 1977 and Black, 1976).
(b) pegging to a basket of currencies
An alternative approach advocates stabilising the
effective exchange rate of a currency. An effective exchange
rate is defined as a trade-weighted average of the exchange
rates of its trading partners. The measure of a country's
effective exchange rate takes into account some of the
conditions affecting trade of the developing country and will,
therefore, reduce distortions and costs arising from movements
in exchange rates among other currencies. It will produce less
instability of the effective exchange than any single currency
peg and also reduce reserve needs. Two disadvantages of this
24
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option is that there will be varying cross-rates among
developing countries' currencies, since each will be pegged
to a different basket. To overcome this drawback, certain
countries have elected to peg the SDR. It will reduce the
variance of the effective exchange rate. In addition, such a
basket may deter foreign investors due to their
unfamiliarity. (Refer to Williamson, 1982, P. 42, C-N, 1977,
P. 131 and Black, 1976, P. 10)
We have already examined the advantages and disadvantages
of each alternative. Next we need to review the objectives
that have been considered to guide the choice of peg in order
to decide how a developing country should choose its peg.
(1) Microeconomic objectives
The widespread concern about exchange rate fluctuations
under the generalized floating system is that exchange rate
uncertainty influences the micro decisions of individuals
firms and other agents in the economy who are engaged in
international trades because it impose a burden of risk, and
therefore costs on them. We know most trade and contracts are
denominated in one major currencies or in the trading
partner's currency in the short-run for most developing
countries. Traders face the risk that payment flows may be
influenced immediately by the exchange rate change if the
domestic currency is not pegged to the foreign currency in
which the contract is specified. The exposure to risk may be
considered as imposing a cost on traders. Some authors think
that the choice of peg should be directed to reduce this type
of short-run exchange rate risk faced by traders and other
transactors. In order to meet this target, a single currency
pegging may be preferred, as discussed above. But it is bought
at the cost of the macro economic instability. In addition,
traders are concerned about the future prices of exports and
imports, which will be influenced by exchange rate change
through their effect on profitability.^ Unexpected exchange
rate fluctuations will be important elements in generating
uncertainty about profit streams and this uncertainty could
bias decisions relating to the structure and level of firms'
output and investment, therefore, another possible objective
of choosing a peg is to reduce the uncertainty about profit
streams faced by agents and firms in the traded-goods sector.
The source of this kind of risk primarily results from the
changes in the bilateral rates against other countries, the
choice of peg influences the stability of each bilateral
rate. (Refer to Williamson,- 1982, P. 44, 46 and 48) Results of
an analysis by Heller (August, 1978) showed that countries with
. Exchange rate development can affect profitability of
suppliers and purchasers because of uncertainty concerning the
future actual spot rates.
26
trade that is highly concentrated in one currency area, such
as the French franc, then a peg to this currency will be the
most suitsble option. Such a peg will eliminate short-run
exchange risk for most transactors and transactions. However,
if one foreign currency is not clearly dominant in
transactions, it may be preferable to peg to a basket of
currencies.
However, even though pegging to a basket of currencies
will stabilize the average bilateral exchange rates, each
individual bilateral rate will vary. What matters for short-
run exchange risk is the relative importance of stability in
each bilateral rate. A " Effective Variation " of exchange
rates is developed by Frankel. In a simulation analysis using
historical exchange rate data, he found the effective
variation is minimized by one of the single-currency pegs
rather than the basket peg considered. Frankel 's results also
illustrate that stability of a weighted average exchange rate
is not essentially to be preferred to stability of the
exchange rate against a single foreign currency. So pegging
to a single currency make easier the reduction of a short-run
risk.
(2) Macroeconomic Objectives
°. It measures the variability of individual bilateral
exchange rates and then aggregates across currencies.
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Another concern is that exchange-rate fluctuations will
influence the attainment of macroeconomic objectives.
Countries can choose a peg to reduce undesirable variability
in macroeconomic target variables. Exchange rate changes
between currencices will affect the behavior of several
macroeconomic variables over varying time horizons. A currency
depreciation, for example, can be expected to affect the
demand for money, aggregate demand, and the levels of prices
and output, as well as to induce external and internal
relative price shifts that alter the composition of
expenditure and output. A currency overvaluation can be
expected to undermine exports, to harm agriculture, stimulate
imports, destabilize the capital account and often precipitate
debt crises, breed protection against imports, promote rent-
seeking economies, etc.
The real effective exchange rate provides a measure of
external competitiveness. The REER indices refer to an average
change in the reporting country's exchange rate against that
of all other countries. However, since this hypothetically
ideal effective exchange rate cannot be computed, it is
necessary to consider simpler indices. There are essentially
three such indices: (1) the export-weighted index (2) the
import-weighted index, and (3) the bilateral trade index. It
is argued that the imported-weighted index is the best
appropriation for developing countries among the three
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alternatives to the effective exchange rate index.
Crockett and Nsoli computed from available data to
examine the divergence of the SDR^° and of a single currency
peg from the import-weighted basket peg for several developing
countries and provided some indication as to the relative
desirability of pegging to the SDR vis-a-vis a single currency
peg on the basis of deviations from the import-weighted basket
peg. Several interesting results emerge from Crocket and
Nsouli (1977):
"First, for most countries the SDR peg deviates
very little from the import-weighted basket peg.
Second, for most countries the SDR basket peg shows
a smaller standard percentage deviation than a
single currency peg. Third, all the countries that
have recently moved to the SDR peg show a smaller
standard percentage deviation for the SDR peg than
for a single currency peg."
Two conclusions are drawn from the results with regard
to pegging to a basket of currencies. (Crockett and Nsouli,
1977) First, if LDCs could reach an effective exchange rate
accurately and could stabilise the value of a currency in
terms of it, then the developing countries would be able to
'.Crockett and Nsouli (1977) argued for import weights, but
some other authors argued in favour of trade weights. See
Williamson(1982) and Crockett and Nsouli(1977) for the reasons.
^°. See Williamson(1982) ,P.58 and P. 59 for the reasons of
adopting SDR as a peg.
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offset the impact of exchange rate changes abroad on their
underlying balance-of-payments position. Second, it was
demonstrated that a single currency peg usually shows a much
greater standard percentage deviation from the import-weighted
basket peg than the SDR-basket peg. Hence, the deviation of
actual exchange rate from the import-weighted exchange rates
of most countries can be reduced by moving from a single
currency peg to the SDR basket peg, except for those with very
close trading ties with one major industrial country.
So the analysis suggests that, for macroeconomic
objectives, pegging to a basket of currencies would generally
be preferable to a single-currency peg.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the theory of the choice
of an exchange rate regime and reviewed the principal issues
to be considered by a developing country in choosing its
exchange rate regime. We claimed that floating is not feasible
for developing countries due to their perticular economic
characteristics, which are different from those of developed
countries, especially due to the underdevelopment of the
domestic financial markets and the lack of integration with
international markets relative to industrial countries.
However, eliminating floating as a feasible or realistic
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option does not rule out the possbility of adopting other
types of flexible exchange rate arrangement. A proposition
advanced from this discussion is that a flexible exchange rate
is always more favorable than a fixed exchange rate in the
face of foreign price shock. (F-H, 1978, P. 55) A general
conclusion drawn from these simple theoretical analysises is
that the optimal exchange regime in the face of different
types of disturbances may be one between a fixed and a fully
flexible exchange rate. The problem is to choose an
appropriate peg. In choosing the appropriate peg, policy
objectives should be our guide.
31
References
Artus, Jacques " Toward a More Oderly Exchange Rate Syatem "
Finance and Development. Vol. 20. March i983.
Bird, Graham, " The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in
Developing Countries " The Philippine Economic Journal.
Vol.18. 1979. pp. 148-62.
Branson, William H. , and Louka T. Katse-Papaefstration, "
Exchange Rate Policy in Developing Countries," IN S. Grossman
and E. Lundberg, The World Economic Order; Past and Prospects.
ed. by sven Grassman and Erik Lundberg (London: Macmillan,
1981; New York: St. Martin's, 1981). pp. 391-419.
Black, Stanley W, Exchange Policies for Less Developeed
Countries in a World of Floating Rates, Essays in
International Finance No. 119 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University, 1976)
.
Blejer, Mario I., and Leonardo Leiderman, " A Monetary
Approach to the Crawling Peg System: Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of Political Economy. Vol.89. Feb. 1981. pp. 132-51.
Bruno, Michael, and Zvi Sussman. " Exchange Rate Flexibility,
Inflation and Strucrtural Change " Journal of Development
Economics. Vol.6. (Dec. 1979). PP. 483-514.
Crockett, Andrew D, and Salah M. Nsouli, " Exchange Rate
Policies for Developing Countries, " Journal of Development
Studies. Vol.13 (January 1977), pp. 125-43.
Driskill, Robert, And Stephen McCafferty, " Speculation,
Rational Expectations, and Stability of the Foreign Exchange
Market, " Journal of International Economics Vol.10. Feb. 1980.
pp91-102.
Enders, Walter, and Lapan, Harvey E., •• International
Economics "
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1987.
Flanders, M. June, and Elhanan Helpman, " On Exchange Rate
Policies for a Small Country, " The Economic Journal
.
Vol.46(march 1978). pp. 44-58.
Frenkel, Jacob A, and Joshua Aizenman, " Aspects of the
Optimal Management of Exchange Rates, " in the International
Monetary System; Choices for the Future . ed. by Michael B.
Connolly(New York: Praeger, 1982)
,
pp. 19-48.
Froyen, Richard T. " Macroeconomics: Theories and Policies "
33
Chapter 17. Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 1983.
Heller, H. Robert, " Determinants of Exchange Rate Practices
,'• Journal of Money. Credit and Banking. Vol.10. August 1978.
Lipschitz, Leslie, "Exchange Rate Policies for Developing
Countries : Some Simple Arguments for Intervention," IMF Staff
Papers. Vol. 25. Dec. 1978. pp. 650-75.
Lipschitz, Leslie, and V. Sundarajan, " The Optimal Basket in
A World of Generalized Floating " IMF staff Papers. Vol.27.
March, 1980. PP. 80-100
Melvin, Michael " The Choice of An Exchange Rate System and
Macro. Stability " Journal of Money. Credit and Banking.
Vol.17, pp. 467-78. Nov. 1985.
Mansur, Ahsan H. " Determining the Appropriate Levels of
Exchange Rates for Developing Economics: Some Methods and
Issues " IMF Staff Papers. Vol.30. Dec. 1983. pp. 784-818.
Nashashibi, Karim " Devaluation in Developing Countries: The
Difficult Choices " Finance and Development. Vol.20. March
1983.
Rhomery, R.R., " Indices of Effective Exchange Rates, " IMF
34
staff Papers. March 1976.
Wickham, Peter " The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in
Developing Countries " IMF Staff Papers. Vol.32. 1985.
pp. 248-88.
Williamson, John, " A Survey of the Literature on the Optimal
Peg," Journal of Development Economics. Vol.11. August 1982.
pp. 39-61.
Tsiang, Shoe. " An experiment with Flexible Exchange Rate
Systems: The Case of Peru, 1950-54 " IMF Staff Papers. Vol.5.
Nov. 1957. pp. 449-76.
35
THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
"
1
by
JIANTING RUAN
B.A. , Xiamen University, Fujian, P.R. of China, 1985
AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Economics
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
1988
Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive study on the choice
of exchange rate system in developing countries. Since the
world's leading industrial countries adopted a system of
floating exchange rates in 1973, several studies have
concentrated on the problem of how developing countries
should adapt their exchange policies. It is widely agreed
that the freely-floating exchange-rate system is infeasible .
for most developing countries, because of factors such as
restriction on the foreign exchange, absence of forward
exchange markets, and poor development of financial markets
and institutions. In addition, it appears that a flexible
exchange rate is always as good as, or better than, a fixed
exchange rate in response to various types of disturbances.
Having concluded that a flexible exchange regime is the most
favorable exchange rate regime for developing countries, the
question of exchange rate policy is not resolved by just
deciding to peg rather than to float. We still need to
decide to what to peg. Based on policy objectives as our
guide in choosing the appropriate peg, we conclude that
pegging to a single currency is preferable for reducing a
short-run risk, and pegging to a basket of currencies is
preferable for realizing macroeconomic stability.
